With map and compass on narrow paths and through shallow waters: discovering the substance of EU democracy promotion by Wetzel, Anne & Orbie, Jan
EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
AIMS 
The aim of the Review is to consider the external posture of the European Union in its relations with 
the rest of the world. Therefore the Review will focus on the political, legal and economic aspects 
of the Union’s external relations. The Review will function as an interdisciplinary medium for the 
understanding and analysis of foreign affairs issues which are of relevance to the European Union and 
its Member States on the one hand and its international partners on the other. The Review will aim at 
meeting the needs of both the academic and the practitioner. In doing so the Review will provide a 
public forum for the discussion and development of European external policy interests and strategies, 
adressing issues from the points of view of political science and policy-making, law or economics. 
These issues should be discussed by authors drawn from around the world while maintaining a 
European focus. 
EDITORIAL POLICY 
The editors will consider for publication unsolicited manuscripts in English as well as commissioned 
articles. Authors should ensure that their contributions will be apparent also to readers outside their 
specific expertise. Articles may deal with general policy questions as well as with more specialized topics. 
Articles will be subjected to a review procedure, and manuscripts will be edited, if necessary, to improve 
the effectiveness of communication. It is intended to establish and maintain a high standard in order 
to attain international recognition. 
SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS 
Manuscripts should be submitted to the Editorial Assistant at the Editorial Office. The manuscript 
should be accompanied by a covering letter stating that the article has not been published, or submitted 
for publication, elsewhere. Authors are asked to submit two copies of their manuscript a well as a copy 
on computer disk. Manuscripts should be 6,000-8,000 words and be typed, double spaced and with wide 
margins. The title of an article should begin with a word useful in indexing and information retrieval. 
Short titles are invited for use as running heads. All footnotes should be numbered in sequential order, 
as cited in the text, and should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet. The author should submit 
a short biography of him or herself. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Copies of books sent to the Editorial Assistant at the Editorial Office will be considered for review. 
EDITORS
Jörg Monar
Professor of Contemporary European Studies,
Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex
Nanette Neuwahl
Professor of European Law, Centre for Research 
in Public Law, University of Montreal
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Professor Christophe Hillion
Europa Institute, University of Leiden,  
The Netherlands
BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
Professor Alasdair Blair
Head of Department of Politics and Public Policy
De Montfort University
The Gateway
Leicester LE1 9BH, UK
Tel: 0116  2577209
Email: ablair@dmu.ac.uk
BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
Professor Sven Biscop
EGMONT, Royal Institute
for International
Relations (IRRI-KIIB)
Rue de Namur 69
1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2-213-40-23
Fax: +32 (0)2-223-41-16
Email: s.biscop@irri-kiib.be
EDITORIAL OFFICE
Dr Saïd Hammamoun, 
Center for Research in Public Law
University of Montreal
C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville
Montreal QC
Canada H3C 3J7
Phone: +1 514 343-6111 # 2661
Fax: +1 514 343-7508
Email: said.hammamoun@umontreal.ca
ADVISORY BOARD
Dr Gianni Bonvicini 
(Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome) 
Professor Jacques Bourrinet 
(University Paul Cezanne (Aix Marseille III)) 
Prof. Dr Günter Burghardt 
(Ambassador (Ret.)) 
Professor Marise Cremona 
(Department of Law, European University Institute, 
Florence) 
Professor Alan Dashwood 
(University of Cambridge) 
Professor Sir David Edward 
(Judge of the Court of Justice of the EC, 1992–2004) 
Dr Geoffrey Edwards 
(University of Cambridge) 
Professor Piet Eeckhout 
(King s College London) 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick 
(House of Lords) 
Professor Christopher Hill 
(University of Cambridge) 
Prof. Dr Horst G. Krenzler 
(Former Director-General External Relations 
and Trade, European Commission) 
Prof. Dr Josef Molsberger 
(Emeritus Professor of Economic Policy, 
University of Tübingen) 
Professor David O’Keeffe
(Founding Joint Editor) 
Dr Jacek Saryusz-Wolski 
(Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament) 
Ambassador Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent 
(Former Permanent Representative of the Kingdom 
of Belgium to the European Union) 
Professor Loukas Tsoukalis 
(University of Athens; President, Hellenic 
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
(ELIAMEP) 
Lord Wallace of Saltaire 
(House of Lords) 
Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler 
(New York University School of Law) 
Prof. Dr Wolfgang Wessels 
(University of Cologne) 
European Foreign Affairs Review 16: 705–725, 2011.
 2011 Kluwer Law International BV.
With Map and Compass on Narrow Paths and through Shallow
Waters: Discovering the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion
ANNE WETZEL & JAN ORBIE
Abstract. This article presents the conclusions that we have drawn from the contributions
to the special issue on the substance of EU democracy promotion. The main findings of
the articles are summarized in a table that includes values for the components of the
embedded democracy framework across the various countries and regions that were
examined. Although some variation can be discerned within the embedded democracy
framework and across the different countries and regions, the EU’s policies remain
firmly entrenched within the notion of embedded liberal democracy. In addition, three
common observations on the substance of EU democracy promotion can be discerned:
(1) the focus on elections has been more limited than expected, (2) the EU has largely
focused on the external context conditions, and (3) the links between the latter and the
partial regimes of democracy are under-specified. Thus, while the EU’s democracy
promotion policies suggest that one model suits all, it is not assumed that one size should
fit all. More generally, it appears that EU democracy promotion sits uneasily between a
‘narrow’ and ‘shallow’ agenda, which can be explained by different factors. At the same
time, it reflects the internal democratic condition of the EU.
I Introduction
‘Democracy Revisited. Which Notion of Democracy for the EU’s External
Relations?’ – This is the title of a policy paper published by the European
Parliament’s Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy.1 It is a contri-
bution to an ongoing discussion about whether the EU should formally and
officially adopt a definition of democracy on which to base its democracy
promotion efforts in the world. This question was originally raised in 2006, when
the Policy Unit of the Council General Secretariat recommended in a discussion
paper on democracy promotion to elaborate on key concepts regarding
 Post-doctoral Fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES),
University of Mannheim.
 Professor at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University.
1 M. Meyer-Resende & J. Wisniewska, Democracy Revisited. Which Notion of Democracy for
the EU’s External Relations? (Brussels: Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, 2009).
democracy support and work on a broad consensus on them.2 In fact, this seems
justified since ‘[p]olicy documents contain different concepts of democracy,
including good governance, pluralist democracy, democratic governance, democ-
ratization, democracy promotion and democracy building’.3 Lately, the term
‘deep democracy’ was added to the list in view of the events in the southern
Mediterranean countries.4 While the need for a ‘European Consensus on Democ-
racy’ is widely acknowledged, the substance of it is difficult to delineate since
there seems to be a lack of a ‘clear strategy in terms of the definition of
democracy’.5 Although the underlying principles of the EU’s definition of
democracy promotion have been identified in an informal document of the
European External Action Service, most Member States have so far prevented
a formal adoption of a ‘European Consensus on Democracy’ in the Council.6
This special issue relates to the debate about the content of EU democracy
promotion but takes a slightly different road to the topic. Instead of asking what
should be the notion of democracy for EU democracy promotion, it asks what is
being promoted. In order to ‘map’ the substance of EU democracy and discover
potentially different substances, we adopted an analytical framework that is based
on the notion of ‘embedded liberal democracy’.7 This notion distinguishes five
partial regimes that a liberal democracy consists of: elections, political rights,
civil rights, horizontal accountability, and elected representatives’ effective
power to govern. These partial regimes are externally embedded into an envi-
ronment whose characteristics are important for their functioning. Here, we look
in particular at stateness, civil society, and socio-economic prerequisites.
The articles assembled in this special issue all explore the research question on
the substance of EU democracy promotion as outlined in the introductory article:
What is the democratic substance that the EU furthers in third countries? While
the contributions employ the same analytical framework, they were not intended
as case studies. Thus, the countries and regions were not selected by application
of strict criteria of research design. Furthermore, they do not follow a common
case study protocol but stress different aspects and have taken their own
approaches towards the topic. Nevertheless, they offer the possibility to gain
2 K. Prunerova & M. Walecki, ‘Report from the Conference Building Consensus about EU
Policies on Democracy Support’ (Prague, 9–10 Mar. 2009), 9.
3 IDEA, Democracy in Development: Global Consultations on the EU’s Role in Democracy
Building (Stockholm, 2009), 16.
4 European Commission & High Representative, A New Response to a Changing Neighbour-
hood, COM (2011) 303, 3.
5 S. Herrero, ‘A Decade of Democracy Promotion through the European Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights’, The EPD Working Papers Series on Democracy Support,
no. 1 (2009): 42.
6 Interview, European External Action Service, 12 May 2011.
7 W. Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’, Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004):
33–58.
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some more general insights into the substance of EU democracy promotion.
In this article, we take the contributions of this special issue as the basis to
‘map’ the substance of EU democracy promotion and compare the different
elements as well as different countries and regions. Table 1, which was compiled
with the help of all contributors, shows that, on the one hand, there is variation
between the different countries and regions. On the other hand, there seem to be
some general trends that cut across the countries and regions. In what follows, we
will interpret the main findings, relate them to the existing literature, and offer
some explanations. In particular, the latter could serve as starting points for
further research on the substance of EU but also other actors’ democracy
promotion.
The article is structured as follows. We start with a mapping exercise of the
main findings of the special issue in a summarizing table. Then, we discuss the
EU’s democracy promotion policies over the eight components of the embedded
democracy framework and look at the substance of EU democracy promotion
across different target countries and regions. This allows us to answer the
research question of this special issue. Despite variation in the content of the
EU democracy promotion policies, we found that the EU’s agenda can be located
mainly between the ‘narrow’ and the ‘shallow’ pole, with a tendency towards a
broad agenda in sub-Saharan Africa, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. To be sure,
‘mainly between’ does not so much mean that we can locate our examples on
different points of this spectrum. We rather want to express that the link between
partial regimes and external conditions in EU democracy promotion is not always
strong and sometimes the two seem to be even decoupled. As will become
obvious below, this made categorization sometimes difficult. We indicated this
finding with the wavy line in Table 1. From the results, we also conclude that
with regard to the substance of democracy promotion, for the EU, one model
suits all but that there is no one size that fits everybody.
II The Components of Embedded Liberal Democracy
In this section, we run through the different components of the embedded
democracy framework that emerged from the country- and region-specific arti-
cles of the special issue but more or less cut across them. We place our findings
in the existing literature and offer explanations for them.
Regarding the core partial regime – elections – we do not find a ‘reflex of
focusing on elections only’.8 In all regions and countries covered, elections have
never been the sole or sole main focus of the EU. This result is particularly
interesting and calls for further in depth study because it seems to contradict
previous findings and one of the standard criticisms of Western democracy
8 Prunerova & Walecki, supra n. 2, 13.
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promotion (see also the introductory article to this special issue). A recent
consultation by the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance with organizations and think tanks in Africa, the Arab
world, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Southeast Asia on
EU democracy promotion revealed that these regions ‘see a much narrower,
procedural, election-focused approach than what successfully characterizes
democracies in Europe’.9 Representatives from these regions criticized in
particular that the EU fails ‘to link procedural democracy to delivery aspects of
democracy’,10 that is, to social and economic development. The articles of the
special issue, however, indicate that socio-economic development plays an
important role in the EU relations with Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the
Pacific region, and Central Asia. Sometimes it is even the main focus of coop-
eration (e.g., some Latin American and Central Asian countries). Nevertheless,
the comparison shows that, in some cases, elections attract particular EU atten-
tion. As the article by Del Biondo on sub-Saharan Africa suggests, aid suspen-
sions based on Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement are usually provoked by
flawed elections. Moreover, improvement in the electoral process appears as the
main reason for the decision to resume aid after suspension, even when other
issues covered in the related consultations are not properly addressed. In addition,
statements by the High Representative (and formerly by the Council Presidency)
related mainly to electoral or constitutional processes in the partner countries.
Thus, in these particular cases, it is justified to speak of a focus on electoral
democracy. However, since cooperation between the EU and the African, Carib-
bean and Pacific (ACP) countries usually includes the promotion of a broad
‘democratic governance’ agenda that even comprises issues not directly related to
democracy on the whole, one could, if at all, only speak of an ‘electoralist
fallacy’ in the sense of negative measures (i.e., sanctions). In turn, in some
countries and regions, the EU pays rather little attention to elections.
For certain countries and regions, this can be explained by the saturation effect,
that is, the lack of necessity to deal with this partial regime (e.g., Czech Republic,
Pacific region). Another reason is that there are other actors that specialize in
election observation, so that there is no need to replicate the efforts. This is true
for Ukraine and Russia as Stewart points out11 but increasingly also for Latin
America as Gratius maintains. Yet another reason is that the EU is not invited to
observe elections, which was the case for the southern Mediterranean. On the
other hand, however, the latter region is an example of limited EU focus on
elections even when accounting for the fact that was seldom asked for support.
9 IDEA, supra n. 3, 7.
10 Ibid., 23.
11 See also M. Meyer-Resende, ‘Exporting Legitimacy: The Record of EU Election Observation
in the Context of EU Democracy Support’, CEPS Working Document 241 (Brussels, 2006), 4–5,
for the same point with regard to the OSCE region.
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While the EU followed elections in the southern Mediterranean countries, this
was at least until recently not regarded as meaningful since flawed elections have
rare provoked serious consequences. Another observation from the articles is that
the EU recognizes elections that take place in an increasingly authoritarian
context as Gratius illustrates with the example of Venezuela. This adds to a list
of examples where the EU did not negatively respond to flawed elections but, in
some cases, even rewarded the respective countries, which includes Ethiopia
(parliamentary elections in 2010), Rwanda, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, the presi-
dential elections in Kenya in 2007, and elections in Azerbaijan in 2005 and
Armenia in 2008. In the latter cases, for example, the EU even offered neigh-
bourhood agreements and increased aid.12 Another interesting observation is
given by Maurizio Carbone who showed how in the case of the 2001 elections
in Fiji DG Development was not willing to use development funds on this issue.
He also writes that with regard to the decision to lift sanctions in this case
‘respect of the Constitution, including the separation of power, was considered
more important than general elections’ by the EU. All this evidence does not
point to a particular EU obsession with free and fair elections; in the last case, it
even seemed to overlook them. In line with this finding, Youngs recently con-
cluded that today ‘if anything, policy has shifted to the other extreme: the
importance of elections is rather under-estimated’.13 Hence, the perceived narrow
focus of EU democracy promotion should be studied in more detail.
Staying with the partial regimes of democracy, the articles suggest that the EU
puts more emphasis on civil rights and horizontal accountability than on political
rights. Civil rights are promoted in almost all countries that are covered in the
articles. The exceptions are countries where the situation is not seen to be
problematic (Ukraine prior to 2010) or where the country does not allow any
promotion of these rights on its territory (Turkmenistan). The diverging EU focus
between political rights and civil rights is puzzling, particularly in the southern
Mediterranean region where the EU’s agenda setting power has led to an increas-
ing cooperation on democracy promotion.14 There are several possible explana-
tions for this pattern. In EU policy documents, democratization and human rights
(which we included under civil rights) are often mentioned in the same breath:
‘[t]he emphasis on the link between human rights and democracy sometimes go so
far as to equate human rights activities with support for democracy building’.15
Thus, there might be a bias already at the conceptual level. A second reason is
related to the domestic context of third countries. As Bicchi showed for funding
12 R. Youngs, The EU’s Role in World Politics. A Retreat from Liberal Internationalism
(London: Routledge, 2010), 64; R. Youngs, ‘Misunderstanding the Maladies of Liberal Democracy
Promotion’, FRIDE Working Paper 106 (Madrid, 2011), 8.
13 Youngs, 2011, supra n. 12.
14 V. van Hu¨llen, ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean. Cooperation against All
Odds?’, KFG Working Paper 9 (Berlin, 2009), 12.
15 IDEA, supra n. 3, 17.
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under the European Initiative (and later Instrument) for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR) in the southern Mediterranean countries, the disbalance between
projects dealing with democracy promotion and projects dealing with human
rights, which was confirmed by Reynaert’s and Gratius’ contributions, stems ‘from
applications, not from selection’.16 Dealing with overtly political issues is more
risky for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and it is more difficult to
integrate democratization projects to the sociopolitical environment. However,
she also showed that the Delegations in the countries sometimes ‘downsized the
scope of the initiative’.17 More particularly, Herrero states that ‘the democracy
promotion strategy of the Instrument has not been adequately translated by Dele-
gations in the guidelines of the Country-Based Support Schemes Calls for propo-
sals, which have tended to focus on human rights related priorities’.18
Another reason for the gap may be methodological. The EU’s human rights
promotion activities span a huge variety of issues – some of them relate to the
rights outlined in the framework, while others are almost completely unrelated to
the political process. Human rights activities as mentioned in the EIDHR calls
comprise, among others, the fight against impunity, torture and death penalty, the
provision of judicial support, the protection of immigrants, labour rights, the
integration of mentally handicapped people into the workplace, and reproductive
rights.19 Bicchi concludes that ‘human rights promoted through the EIDHR micro-
projects tend to be relatively uncontroversial and less relevant in terms of democ-
racy promotion’.20 Thus, the focus on civil rights (that are only a part of human
rights as understood by the EU) may be overrated in the articles. Further research
should thus pay particular attention to disaggregating EU human rights activities.
Horizontal accountability also figures prominently among the partial regimes
that receive quite some EU attention. However, similar to the issue of human
rights, further research should disaggregate the substance that is subsumed under
the label of judicial reform and filter those activities that are indeed increasing
the independence of the judiciary and thus the system of checks and balances. As
Youngs points out with regard to neighbouring countries, ‘the Commission’s rule
of law aid programmes are guided by measures of success related to case-load
management and speeding up court systems to deal with the serious backlog of
cases [ . . . ], rather than with judicial independence’.21 This may even be
detrimental to strengthening accountability. In Central Asia, an analysis of the
EU’s regional Rule of Law Initiative reveals the latter’s focus on ‘commercial
16 F. Bicchi, ‘Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An Overview’, Mediterranean
Politics 14, no. 1 (2009): 71.
17 Ibid., 69.
18 Herrero, supra n. 5, 8.
19 Ibid., 32.
20 Bicchi, supra n. 16, 71.
21 R. Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion as External Governance?’, Journal of European Public
Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 902.
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and trade law reform and building a transparent legal framework for the devel-
opment of a market economy’, which led the analyst to demand a greater focus
on issues such as ‘greater independence and transparency of courts’ if the EU
wanted to live up to its self-image as normative actor.22 Similarly, Reynaert
showed in her article that in the southern Mediterranean countries the main goal
of the EU’s support for the judiciary is often the fight against corruption and the
support of business and, eventually, the working of the free market instead of
genuine reinforcement of the system of ‘checks and balances’. Even if these
reforms are intended to support democratization in the long run, Carothers points
out that the idea according to which the introduction of rule of law principles in
the economic domain would ‘bleed over into parts of the legal sector more
germane to political reform’ is ‘based more on hope than experience’.23
Regarding the effective power to govern, it becomes clear that among the
countries and regions covered in this special issue, the EU supports this partial
regime only in the ACP region, with an increasing tendency in sub-Saharan Africa,
where some Security Sector Reform projects are conducted, but also elsewhere.
This is a surprising result insofar as there are other countries and regions where
elected representatives are restricted to govern effectively. One example would be
Morocco, where ‘the parliament is toothless vis-a`-vis the makhzen’ and the king
controls all three branches of power.24 Still, the ‘heart of power’ has rarely been
addressed by democracy promoters.25 One explanation for this abstinence could be
the sensitivity of the topic. An example where the EU even backed developments
that are detrimental to the effective power to govern for elected representatives is
given by Reynaert. In Jordan, the EU supported the establishment of the Aqaba
Special Economic Zone, which is governed by the Aqaba Special Zone Authority.
The latter is not democratically elected and does not allow for influence from
democratically elected representatives. With regard to cases beyond the special
issue, it should be noted that the EU has put special emphasis on this component in
Turkey, where it demands civilian control of the military.
When turning to the external supporting conditions, the articles show that the
EU has, in general, put a lot of emphasis on them. The papers found a strong
focus on ‘stateness’, which takes the medium position between socio-economic
development and civil society. However, one methodological point must be kept
in mind. By comprising issues of state building, anti-corruption measures, good
governance, and administrative reform, this category is very broad. It may, thus,
suggest a focus on one issue when in fact the EU addresses rather different
22 R. Isaacs, ‘The EU’s Rule of Law Initiative in Central Asia’, EUCAM Policy Brief 9 (2009):
4–5; Youngs, 2010, supra n. 12, 74.
23 T. Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?’, Journal of Democracy
20, no. 1 (2009): 11.
24 A. Khakee, ‘Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco. Project Report’ (Madrid: FRIDE,
2010): 2.
25 Ibid., 18.
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things. Furthermore, this may lead to distortions regarding the emphasis. In future
research, this category should, therefore, be disaggregated further. In general, the
articles of the special issue underline the importance of ‘governance’ promotion.
This resonates with previous findings.26 One of the reasons for the comparatively
wide and – when compared to political rights and elections – privileged promo-
tion of governance may be that, in many countries, this area remains an issue.
This is particularly relevant for the (former) candidate countries, such as the
Czech Republic and Slovakia in this special issue, and some neighbourhood
countries, in particular Ukraine (see also in this special issue). Here, EU support
for governance reforms is mainly aimed at the adoption of EU rules and standards
by these countries.27 Apart from these cases, however, a note of caution is in
order. While for analytical purposes we included the support of the external
enabling conditions in our study of the substance of EU democracy promotion,
it must be remembered that they do not, by themselves, form part of democracy
(see introductory article). Thus, the prioritization of governance over the partial
regimes of ‘political rights’ and ‘elections’ (for whatever reason) is potentially
worrying in regions where the situation of the partial regimes is problematic,
which is often the case in Central Asia, the southern Mediterranean, and sub-
Saharan Africa. This is even more relevant when EU policymakers do not seem to
have a clear view on how governance promotion relates to democratization. As
Youngs found for the Middle East, ‘[t]he relationship between Europe’s extensive
range of governance work and broader political reform has been worryingly
under-conceptualized. [ . . . ] Many EU governance projects appear in this sense
simply to have strengthened the policy-making capacity of ruling elites and helped
shore-up incumbent regimes’.28 Thus, while the governance agenda may have the
advantage that it allows to raise sensitive political issues under a more technical
banner,29 there is a risk that it pushes the EU’s policies in a more technocratic
direction. Several studies have noted that the EU’s notion of governance corre-
sponds more with the narrow view of the World Bank than with a broader
democratic agenda.30 This was even confirmed by an EU official who stressed
that the EU has mainly focused on economic governance, thereby hiding behind
politically sensitive issues without really addressing democracy concerns.31 In line
26 For example, R. Youngs, Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000–2006
(Madrid: FRIDE, 2006), 71.
27 R. Youngs, ‘Trends in Democracy Assistance. What Has Europe Been Doing?’, Journal of
Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008): 166.
28 R. Youngs, ‘European Democracy Promotion in the Middle East’, Internationale Politik und
Gesellschaft [International Politics and Society] 4 (2004): 117.
29 T. Freyburg et al., ‘EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood’, Journal
of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 916–934.
30 For example, W. Hout, ‘Governance and Development: Changing EU Policies’, Third World
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2010): 1–12.
31 Interview, supra n. 6.
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with these findings, Del Biondo and Reynaert suggest that the EU’s ‘democratic
governance’ agenda has been instrumental for other objectives such as the imple-
mentation of development projects and market-based reforms rather than democ-
racy promotion as such.
Similar observations have been made in relation to civil society promotion.
This is not as pronounced as could be expected given that a decade ago, it was
concluded that ‘[t]he EU has adopted a distinctive, bottom-up approach to
democracy assistance’, with a particular focus on NGOs.32 Some of the limited
emphasis we see can certainly be attributed to the disapproval of civil society
support by third state governments, as was shown by Gratius for the case of
Venezuela and Bossuyt/Kubicek for Turkmenistan. For EIDHR projects that do
not need the formal consent of the third state’s government, there are sometimes
hurdles of registration for NGOs, as Reynaert points out. However, in some
instances, the EU seems to deliberately choose a more governmental approach,
as in Latin America. Gratius points to a shift away from civil society promotion
in Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela. Another remarkable aspect that was high-
lighted in the articles is the sometimes instrumental logic that is behind civil
society promotion. Where the EU has put much emphasis on civil society in its
external relations, this has often been aimed at other objectives than democracy
promotion. For example, the involvement of civil society in third countries has
served to facilitate other EU objectives such as development (see Del Biondo) or
market-based reforms (see Reynaert),33 while disregarding any direct connection
with democracy promotion. Stewart finds that the EU supports NGOs that are
active in fields it considers particularly relevant and that could help advance
approximation to EU standards. This resembles the EU approach during the
Eastern enlargement process.34 Reynaert makes a similar observation in the
southern Mediterranean countries where a large part of civil society promotion
is not aimed at strengthening public participation per se but at fighting corruption
and good governance and thus at supporting the EU’s more general aim of
economic reform. Such cases are questionable instances of civil society promo-
tion when viewed from a democracy promotion perspective. Another paradox
regarding EU civil society promotion can be seen in the fact that funds in fact
return to Europe because Western NGOs win the contracts.35 In a recent piece,
32 R. Youngs, ‘European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On’, European
Foreign Affairs Review 6, no. 3 (2001): 362.
33 See also S. Hurt, ‘Civil Society and European Union Development Policy’, in New Pathways
in International Development. Gender and Civil Society in EU Policy, eds M. Lister & M. Carbone
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); G. Crawford, ‘The European Union and Strengthening Civil Society in
Africa’, in Lister & Carbone (eds), ibid.
34 L.K. Hallstrom, ‘Eurocratising Enlargement? EU Elites and NGO Participation in European
Environmental Policy’, Environmental Politics 13, no. 1 (2004): 175–193.
35 C. Barrios, ‘Assessing Democracy Assistance: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Project
Report’ (Madrid: FRIDE, 2010), 11–12.
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Youngs points to a series of deficiencies regarding EU civil society promotion
and quotes a Kenyan civil society activist with the words that the EU tries ‘to
promote reform without reformers’.36
As already indicated above, the last partial regime, socio-economic prerequi-
sites, turned out to be the most and most evenly emphasized external condition.
As the contributions of Bossuyt and Kubicek as well as Gratius show, on paper,
the EU is, in some cases, aware of the link between the socio-economic situation
and democracy. Furthermore, in countries such as Cuba where overt democracy
promotion is rejected, it is seen as an indirect way of EU democracy promotion.
However, as was already discussed above, at least in some instances, the pro-
motion of socio-economic conditions and the promotion of the partial regimes of
democracy seem to be rather loosely connected. In others, and counter to the
argument of democracy promotion as determined by the ‘electoralist fallacy’,
concerns about the socio-economic development seem to override concern for the
partial regimes. In Latin America, EU democracy promotion takes place under a
development label, which subordinates the shape of the substance to a develop-
ment rationale. The perhaps most explicit example of the difficult relationship
was given by Carbone who reported DG Development denying development
funds for election support. Both the recognition of interconnectedness and the
practical challenges correspond to more general trends.37
III The Target Countries and Regions
Whereas the previous section showed that some components of liberal democracy are
generally more promoted than others, this section will show that the type of EU
democracy promotion varies between countries. When looking at the country and
regional level, that is, the rows in Table 1, it becomes clear that there is considerable
variation across countries and regions and even within most regions. Different
components of the embedded democracy framework have been promoted to different
degrees. This section attempts to map similarities and variation. We furthermore try
to account for the patterns that emerged on the basis of the articles in this special
issue. How and to what extent do EU democracy promotion policies vary (or not
vary) and how can we explain divergences (or similarities) in geographic approaches?
We will start with the substance of EU democracy promotion towards sub-Saharan
Africa, because this is apparently the region where the EU comes closest to the
‘broad liberal democracy promotion’ agenda (see Figure 1 in the introductory article),
and use this as a reference point for comparisons with other countries and regions.
Indeed, the EU’s approach towards sub-Saharan Africa and (to a lesser extent)
the Pacific corresponds with the broad liberal democracy promotion agenda.
36 Youngs, 2010, supra n. 12, 75.
37 T. Carothers, ‘The Elusive Synthesis’, Journal of Democracy 21, no. 4 (2010): 12–26.
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Contrary to expectations from the literature (see above), EU policies do not
remain limited to the promotion of the core electoral regime but extend to the
other partial regimes as well as the external conditions. As Del Biondo’s article
makes clear, elections are a ‘key’ aspect of the EU’s approach, but they are far
from the only dimension of the EU’s democracy agenda towards sub-Saharan
Africa. How can we account for the ambitious content of the EU’s policies,
compared with other countries and regions? A first explanation concerns the
significant degree of asymmetric interdependence between both regions, which
gives the EU a bargaining advantage.38 It goes without saying that sub-Saharan
African countries, which are often the former colonies of EU Member States, are
still relatively weak in relation to the EU. Although the emergence of new actors
such as China may have increased the bargaining power of some sub-Saharan
African countries vis-a`-vis Europe,39 the latter continue to be in a weak position.
Thus, the EU has a considerable margin of manoeuvre to advance the whole
spectrum of its democracy promotion agenda. From this perspective, it may not
be surprising that the EU’s democracy promotion policies towards this region
largely represent the official, broad view on the substance of EU democracy
promotion as outlined in several Commission Communications and in the EU-
ACP Cotonou Agreement. Conversely, when countries are less dependent, for
example, when the EU has substantial interests in the country and needs cooper-
ation of this country in order to meet its interests, we could expect that the EU’s
definition of democracy will be more narrow or shallow. For example, this may be
true in the case of Ethiopia, where the EU has considerable geostrategic interests.40
However, asymmetric interdependence as such cannot sufficiently account for
the broadness of the EU’s liberal democracy agenda, since the EU’s democracy
promotion policies towards the Central and Eastern European candidate countries
have been much more limited. Although the EU disposed of a considerably more
powerful mechanism for its democracy agenda – conditionality with the ‘carrot’
of membership – the article by De Ridder and Kochenov shows that the substance
promoted through enlargement conditionality has been more narrow or shallow
than in relation to sub-Saharan Africa. Obviously, this difference between both
regions points to the importance of the existing democratic situation as a context
condition for the EU’s policies: Freedom House Scores presented in Table 1
leave no doubt that the Czech Republic and Slovakia belong to the most demo-
cratic countries that are included in the sample (note that De Ridder and
38 R.O. Keohane & J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd edn (New York: Harper Collins,
1989), Ch. 1.
39 See, e.g., A. Fraser & L. Whitfield, ‘Understanding Contemporary Aid Relationships’, in
The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors, ed. L. Whitfield (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 74–107.
40 Cf. S. Bru¨ne, ‘Testfall A¨thiopien: Die neue Afrikastrategie der Europa¨ischen Union’, in
European External Democracy Promotion, eds M. Knodt & A. Ju¨nemann (Baden Baden: Nomos,
2007), 53–70.
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Kochenov’s article concerns the period from 1997 onwards), while countries in
the sub-Saharan African region are mainly ‘not free’ or ‘partly free’. As Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier point out with regard to democratic conditionality
during EU Eastern enlargement ‘in the democratic frontrunners, such as the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, EU governance was unnecessary for
democratization and democratic consolidation’.41 This corresponds with a ‘satu-
ration effect’, that is, that the partner countries have reached such a level of
democratization that an EU policy of democracy promotion is no longer deemed
necessary. It also explains why the EU’s policies towards the Pacific region,
which together with sub-Saharan Africa belongs to the ACP group, have focused
less on the ‘core’ electoral regime. Despite the problematic cases of Fiji and the
Solomon Islands that Carbone studied in his article, free and fair elections are
held regularly in most countries of the Pacific region.
Differences in terms of democratic saturation might also explain why the EU
has mainly promoted the ‘effective power to govern’ partial regime in the ACP
region, namely because in several sub-Saharan African countries the elected
representatives have not been able to govern the country because of effective
control by the military in some areas. On the other hand, as explained above, there
are several non-ACP countries where the government’s effective power is also
questionable but where the EU’s democracy promotion activities have not focused
on this issue (e.g., power of the military in Brazil and the monarchy in Morocco).
While it is plausible to expect a narrower or shallower democracy promotion
strategy towards more democratized countries, several articles show that the
opposite cannot be said. A closer look at some other countries suggests again
the importance of interdependence for explaining variation in the substance the
EU’s democracy promotion.42 It seems that a more narrow or shallow type is
being promoted towards countries that are important for the EU’s economic,
geopolitical, and security interests such as Russia (energy), Colombia (fight
against drugs and against terrorism), and Turkmenistan (energy interests).
In the case of the southern Mediterranean countries, the EU’s policy was until
recently shaped by a conflict of interest between stability and democratization.43
Even if the track record of these countries in terms of liberal democracy
remains doubtful – the Freedom House would score them as ‘non-free’ or ‘partly
41 F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4
(2004): 669.
42 See also M. Knodt & A. Ju¨nemann, ‘Introduction. Theorizing EU External Democracy
Promotion’, in Knodt & Ju¨nemann (eds), supra n. 40, 20–21.
43 A. Ju¨nemann, ‘Externe Demokratiefo¨rderung im su¨dlichen Mittelmeerraum: Ein rollentheor-
etischer Erkla¨rungsansatz fu¨r die Kluft zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit in den EU-
Außenbeziehungen’, in Der Nahe Osten im Umbruch. Zwischen Transformation und Autoritaris-
mus, eds M. Beck, C. Harders, A. Ju¨nemann & S. Stetter (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009), 151–174.
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free’ – the democratic substance promoted by the EU towards these countries has
been much more narrow or shallow compared with the ACP group.
However, the type of EU democracy promotion has equally been limited
towards countries that are only of limited economic, geopolitical, or security
interest to the EU, such as Cuba and Venezuela. This points to the relevance of a
third explanation, namely the cooperativeness of the target countries.
For example, the Castro regime and the Cha´vez government have explicitly
rejected the western-style liberal democratic model. These countries simply do
not accept external democracy promotion initiatives on their territory. Similarly,
the article on Central Asia made clear that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are very
reluctant to cooperate on democracy-related issues. As Reynaert points out, even
projects under the EIDHR, which do not need the third-country governments’
consent, face potential hurdles such as the necessity of prior official registration
of NGOs.
In this context, it should be noted that some countries have come up with
alternative models under a label of democracy, for example, the Russian concept
of ‘sovereign democracy’ (see Stewart), which has also been used by some
Central Asian governments, and the participative or direct democracy discourses
in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, or Venezuela (see Gratius). Whether or not these
challenges to liberal notions of democracy serve to justify authoritarian practices,
it is interesting to note that the EU does not seem to be able or willing to take up
this development. The articles in the special issue show that there are differences
in the extent to which the components (partial regimes and external conditions) of
liberal democracy are promoted, but there are no indications of whether and how
the EU engages with such conceptual challenges. Further research should clarify
how exactly the EU’s democracy promotion activities deal conceptually with
non-liberal democratic systems. One related and particularly timely question
would be whether and how the EU engages with the Arab countries at a concep-
tual level. In reaction to the revolutions, the EU is indeed thinking about changes
in the substance of its policy, for example, by putting more emphasis on support
for political parties and political society.44 However, it would be interesting to
see how inclusive this process is with regard to the partner countries’ ideas of
designing democratic institutions.
Until now, we have used the EU’s broad approach towards the ACP as a
reference point in relation to other regions. However, some qualifications about
the ostensibly ambitious approach towards the ACP group should be made. First,
the EU’s activities towards the South Pacific are less ambitious than it seems at
first sight: Although EU policies tick all the boxes of the liberal democracy
framework, they rather look like a ‘light’ version of the EU’s approach towards
44 Representatives from the Commission and European Parliament at the Round Table on
‘Efficiency of European Democracy Promotion’, organized by the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (Brussels,
29 Mar. 2011).
WITH MAP AND COMPASS ON NARROW PATHS AND THROUGH SHALLOW WATERS 719
sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, Carbone’s study makes clear that the EU has
effectively delegated important decisions to other major powers in the Pacific.
Thus, although both the Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa are subsumed under the
same institutional framework of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement, and although
both regions fall under the responsibility of the DG Development within the
Commission, there have been different approaches to the defining of the sub-
stance of EU democracy promotion that cannot only be explained by differences
in the existing level of democracy. Only recently has there been a realization in
Brussels that the EU may have complied too blindly with the advice from
Australia and New Zealand. Second, even in sub-Saharan Africa, which has
traditionally been much closer to the EU’s sphere of influence than the Pacific,
the ostensibly broad approach to democracy promotion should be put into
perspective. Del Biondo’s research shows that by repackaging the EU’s democ-
racy promotion objectives into the new and broad governance agenda, officially
labelled the ‘democratic governance’ agenda, the importance of democratization as
an end in itself has been reduced, ‘to the benefit of aid efficiency and even the
promotion of EU interests’. Partly in line with Reynaert’s article on the Mediter-
ranean, she argues that the EU’s good governance agenda has served to advance
objectives such as economic liberalization rather than democracy per se. In addi-
tion, Del Biondo points out that while a broad democratic governance approach is
promoted through various activities such as the Governance Incentive Tranche, the
application of sanctions by the EU has aimed to promote a narrower, electoral form
of democracy. This suggests that there might be a correlation between the EU’s
strategy (soft or hard approach) and its substance (respectively, broad or narrow) in
promoting democracy towards developing countries. Whereas incentive-based
democracy promotion strategies aim at a broad type, sanctioning strategies follow
a rather narrow interpretation of democracy promotion.
Another interesting observation with regard to the ‘democratic governance’
agenda is that the substance of EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan region is
influenced by the paradigms of international development cooperation. In a
similar vein, Reynaert concludes that the substance of EU democracy promotion
in the southern Mediterranean region is shaped by the policy paradigm of
economic liberalization. Gratius points to a ‘transition paradigm’ to which EU
democracy promoters cling in Latin America. Furthermore, she suggests that
democracy promotion in this region is informed by the ‘intrinsic social democ-
racy model’. Although none of the authors has explicitly researched the role of
paradigms and templates for the definition of the substance of EU democracy
promotion, the findings indicate that they are important and should receive more
(critical) attention.
Finally, it appears that the EU does not have a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in
the sense that the components of the embedded democracy framework are
promoted in exactly the same way and ‘dose’ everywhere. Several articles
illustrate that the substance of EU democracy promotion differs within the same
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region. This might be surprising since the same institutional framework applies to
these countries. Del Biondo makes this point in relation to sub-Saharan Africa:
While the EU’s overall substance is based on the same template, there is also
differentiation based on the countries’ particular needs and their degree of
cooperativeness. The most obvious examples come from the Central Asian
region, as shown in the article by Bossuyt and Kubicek. Despite similarities,
the five Central Asian countries differ in the level of democratization (e.g.,
medium in Kyrgyzstan, very weak in Uzbekistan), in the energy and security
interests held by the EU (e.g., strong in Kazakhstan, weaker in Tajikistan), and in
the substance of EU democracy promotion (e.g., broad liberal approach in
Kyrgyzstan, shallow in Uzbekistan). Analysing these variables, the authors come
to the conclusion that the EU has a broader liberal democracy promotion agenda
towards those countries that show some commitment to political liberalization
and a more narrow or shallow type towards states that oppose any democratic
openings. The level of cooperativeness appears as an important determinant for
the emergence of a broader substance of EU democracy promotion. However,
strategic interests also play a role. Thus, the narrow approach towards Turkmen-
istan may not be surprising, since the government is not receptive to political
liberalization while the EU has strong energy interests in Turkmenistan. The
broad liberal approach towards Kyrgyzstan corresponds with weaker interests
and medium cooperativeness on democratic issues. The case of Kazakhstan
shows that the EU can pursue some elements of a broad liberal democracy
agenda despite strong interests in the country, provided that there is some degree
of cooperativeness.
In addition to the EU’s (forced) adaptability with regard to the cooperativeness
of target countries, we also see a certain attempt to tailor the substance to the
particular identified ‘misfits’. As Stewart shows on the case of Ukraine, there
have been shifts of (rhetorical) emphasis placed on certain areas after the election
of a new president in February 2010. Del Biondo points to the Governance
Profiles that the EU draws up for each ACP country as part of the Governance
Initiative and that serve as a basis for cooperation on and financial assistance for
these issues.
IV One Model Suits All: But Not One Size Fits Everybody?
Based on these observations, we can conclude that there is variation in the
substance of EU democracy promotion in two ways. Some components of the
embedded democracy framework are generally, that is, across the countries and
regions, emphasized more than others and the EU’s policies are differentiated
when we compare the target countries and regions. Several explanations for the
variance in the EU’s agenda of democracy promotion have been put forward.
For example, the previous section made clear that the degree of cooperativeness
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and asymmetric interdependence are important factors. On the other hand, geo-
graphical proximity does not seem to matter. While it could be expected that the
EU pursues a broader agenda towards geographically closer countries (see intro-
ductory article to this special issue), the contrast between the southern Mediter-
ranean and sub-Saharan African regions makes clear that this expectation does
not hold. Further research should elaborate these and other – including EU
internal – explanations by engaging in more systematic hypothesis testing based
on a larger amount of systematically chosen cases.
However, these seem to be variations on the same theme. While the EU is
obviously not promoting the same components of embedded democracy to the
same extent in every country and region, there are some commonalities that
characterize the EU’s democracy promotion policies ranging from the neighbour-
hood countries to the South Pacific. On a general level, it should be noted that the
EU’s policies remain firmly entrenched within the notion of embedded democ-
racy as described in the introduction to this special issue. Thus, the observed
variation can be seen as differences of emphasis within the same model. While
the EU’s democracy promotion policies suggest that one model suits all, it is not
assumed that one size should fit all. In addition, there are no indications that the
EU has promoted any other model than the liberal democratic model. However,
since the occurrence of such other democratic models has not been the focus of
this research, future studies should investigate this further. They may well
discover instances of variation between (elements of) different models rather
than variation within the same model, for example, at the micro-level of project
implementation. When projects put considerable emphasis on the ‘talk-centric’
aspect of democracy,45 this may indicate the promotion of a deliberative model.
In any case, several articles included in the special issue (e.g., Gratius and
Stewart) do make clear that the EU does not engage in a dialogue on the meaning
of democracy with countries that challenge (western) conceptions of democracy
such as Russia, Venezuela, and some Central Asian states. The EU does not seem
to be able or willing to take up this debate on what exactly constitutes the
substance of democracy promotion.
Zooming into the variation within the liberal democratic model, we can still
discern three general observations that apply to all the regions and countries that
have been studied in this special issue. First, the emphasis on the electoral core of
the embedded democracy model has been less pronounced than could be expected
on the basis of the literature. The articles in this special issue rather showed a
limited EU attention for free and fair elections compared to the other components
of the framework. Second, and in contrast to the first observation, the external
conditions have been highlighted in the EU’s democracy promotion policies.
The EU seems to attach great importance to the fostering of ‘stateness’, ‘civil
45 J.S. Dryzek, ‘Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building’, Comparative Political
Studies 42, no. 11 (2009): 1381.
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society’, and ‘socio-economic development’. This finding corresponds with those
authors who characterize the EU’s policies as developmental rather than political
or democracy-oriented.46 However, it is unclear how exactly these external condi-
tions have been aimed to foster the partial regimes of the framework.
This is brings us to the third observation, namely that the linkages between the
EU’s support of the external conditions and the partial regimes of democracy have
not been well-defined. For example, how do support for civil society, development
programming, trade relations, and good governance relate to the advancement of
democratic systems in third countries? It is unclear how exactly the external
conditions might connect with the partial regimes of a democratic system. One
possibility may be that the EU’s promotion of the external conditions is directly
and explicitly aimed to contribute to democracy promotion, as in the case of
Central Asia (see Bossuyt and Kubicek). Alternatively, in relation to the Euro-
Mediterranean relations, Reynaert argued that the EU’s approach to the external
conditions sidelined the promotion of the partial regimes of embedded democracy
and, in effect, was even detrimental. Yet another possibility is that both run in
parallel: The EU’s promotion of the external conditions has objectives of its own
(e.g., aid effectiveness and investment facilitation). This view seems to be shared
by most authors in the special issue. Rather than having a thought-through strategy
on how to promote a broad democratic agenda, the EU seems to suggest that ‘all
good things go together’.47 This observation may be reinforced by the well-known
compartmentalization of the EU’s external relations,48 which hinders coherence
between, for example, external development and democracy promotion policies.
The establishment of the European External Action Service might increase coher-
ence of EU external relations, although there are still ‘strong divisions’ between,
for example, democracy promotion people and developmentalists.49
In conclusion, in the absence of more detailed knowledge about the link
between the partial regimes and external supporting conditions in EU democracy
promotion, the overall substance sits uneasily between a narrow and a shallow
agenda. A broader agenda has only been found in relation to the ACP region, in
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and even in Del Biondo’s article, some serious question
marks on the EU’s seemingly broad agenda in sub-Saharan Africa have been
formulated. Of course, it should be noted that for some countries (e.g., Czech
Republic) there was simply no need to promote a broad agenda while others
(Cuba and Turkmenistan) disallowed the EU to do so. All articles show that there
has been much focus on the external context conditions, and in several cases,
46 For example, Carothers, 2009, supra n. 23.
47 S. Grimm, J. Leininger & T. Freyburg (eds), ‘Do All Good Things Go Together? Conflicting
Objectives in Democracy Promotion’, Democratization (Special Issue) 19, no. 3 (forthcoming in
June 2012).
48 See, e.g., O. Elgstro¨m & J. Pilegaard, ‘Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partner-
ship Agreements’, Journal of European Integration 30, no. 3 (2008): 363–380.
49 Interview, supra n. 6.
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there has been less focus on the partial regimes. The ambiguities on the exact
linkages between the external conditions and the core democratic components
(Will socio-economic development, good governance, and civil society promo-
tion eventually lead to democracy? What would be the mechanisms behind such a
process?) explain why most authors are hesitating between the ‘narrow’ and
‘shallow’ agendas. It is fair to add that not only there is ambiguity in the EU’s
view on this issue but also the conceptual framework remains rather silent in this
regard. Further research should, thus, also put more emphasis on the conceptual
specification of the relationship between the partial regimes and external
conditions.
On a more general level, we could conclude that the EU’s general emphasis on
the external conditions may, in part, reflect the nature of the beast. The EU
project itself has been geared towards deepening economic integration and
building multilevel governance structures. Thus, the EU has ample experience
with the promotion of economic development, the involvement of non-state
actors (including civil society), and the fostering of good governance and a
functioning administration internally. These conclusions correspond with ‘Type
IV’ democracy promotion as described in the introduction of the special issue and
with expectations (b) and (c) on the linkage between the EU’s own democratic
condition and its external democracy promotion policies. In contrast, as stressed
in the article by De Ridder and Kochenov, the EU’s competences in the core
democratic institutions such as electoral regimes or political rights are rather
limited. As the articles in this special issue show, expectation (a) is not rein-
forced. At the same time, there is not much support for expectation (d) either:
With the exception of the article on Latin America, which briefly mentions the
‘intrinsic social democracy policy of the EU’, there are no indications that the
substance of EU democracy promotion has been closely linked to the welfare
state arrangements. When considering the socio-economic conditions, most
authors pointed to poverty reduction and/or economic liberalization initiatives,
but social redistribution policies were not mentioned. Although this seems to be
in line with existing studies,50 more research would be needed to assess the
social-democratic influence on the substance of EU democracy promotion. After
all, social redistribution issues are still mainly a domain of the Member States.
In sum, the emphasis on the promotion of the external conditions of the
embedded democracy framework corresponds with the acquis communautaire.
This can be simply summarized by means of the following paradox: While the
50 The EU’s global social agenda has been more ambitious in relation to Latin America
compared with other regions and that market considerations have overshadowed social objectives.
See J. Orbie, ‘Work in Progress: The Social Dimension of EU-Africa Relations’, in The European
Union and Africa, ed. M. Carbone (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); J. Orbie & L.
Tortell, ‘Exporting the European Social Model: Broadening Ambitions, Increasing Coherence?’,
Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 2 (2009): 99–104.
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external conditions of embedded democracy are central to the EU project, the
partial regimes of the model are only peripheral to the mission of the EU.
Although it has become clear from the above discussions that an ‘essentialist’
argument is certainly not a sufficient explanation for the substance of EU
democracy promotion, we still suggest investigating further how rational and
ideational factors shape the EU’s agenda. For example, it is conceivable that the
reluctance of EU Member States to formalize a ‘European Consensus on Democ-
racy’ does not only stem from rational considerations of preserving ‘wiggle
room’51 but may also be interpreted from a constructivist perspective, focusing
on the EU’s identity.
51 Interview, supra n. 6.
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